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#2-72 X TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
12 JAN 1972 CONF

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda


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12 JANUARY 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 - 9 JANUARY 1972

Moscow (2779 items)

Indochina	(14%)	14%
[U.S. Air Raids	(13%)	10%]
Indian-Pakistani	(3%)	9%*
Conflict	(--)	7%]
["Anderson		
Papers"		
China	(6%)	8%*
Mars 2 & 3 Probes	(2%)	2%
Chilean CP	(4%)	2%
Anniversary		
Middle East	(1%)	2%

Peking (1555 items)

Domestic Issues	(35%)	39%
Indochina	(14%)	19%
[16th Anniversary	(--)	7%]
of Lao Patriotic		
Front		
[U.S. Air Raids	(7%)	2%]
New Year's Joint	(5%)	5%
Editorial		
Indian-Pakistani	(14%)	3%
Conflict		
PRC Nuclear Test	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the Indian-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are included in the figure on India-Pakistan and amount to 2% of total Moscow comment.

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INDOCHINA

The Paris talks on 6 January--the first session since 9 December--provided a forum for further criticism of the concentrated U.S. air strikes against the DRV and of the President's 2 January TV interview, and for restatement of the hardened negotiating terms spelled out by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong during his November visit to Peking. However, VNA typically only selectively reports the communist delegates' statements at the session. The only additional, substantial comment on the President's TV interview came in a NHAN DAN item on the 7th--described by VNA English as "a signed commentary" but called a "Commentator" article in excerpts broadcast by Hanoi radio in Mandarin on the 10th. The Mandarin-language version, among other things, contains an apparent indirect reference to the President's remarks on his forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow when it says: "Nixon has vainly attempted to use diplomatic maneuvers to cover up and overcome his difficulties in other spheres."

Peking first acknowledged the President's remarks on Indochina in his TV interview in 6 January NCNA reports of LPA and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries. It belatedly commented on its own authority in an NCNA item on the 8th which complained that both the President and Secretary Rogers in his TV interview on the 5th had justified the bombings of the DRV on the basis of the "so-called" prisoner of war problem. In a departure from its general practice, Peking reported the Paris session of the 6th at which the communist delegates took sharp issue with the President's remarks--an action presumably aimed at reassuring Hanoi regarding the President's visit to Peking.

Moscow's continued criticism of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam persists in the line that Sino-American developments had encouraged the United States to carry out the strikes. And some commentators again raise the specter of a behind-the-scenes deal on Vietnam to be made during the President's visit to Peking next month.

DELEGATES AT PARIS, NHAN DAN ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S TV INTERVIEW

The VNA account of the Paris session on the 6th says cryptically that PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien "completely refuted" the President's "allegations" in his TV interview "as a prize deception and a bellicose challenge to war." The account thus

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fails to report the details of Tien's remarks in which he said that the President "continued to repeat deceitful allegations, distorting the truth and holding the Vietnamese people responsible for the prolongation of the war, the deadlock of the Paris conference, and the fact that captured U.S. militarymen cannot yet go home." VNA also omits Tien's charge that the President "made arrogant threats that the United States would continue to 'Vietnamize' the war, maintain U.S. troops for a prolonged occupation of South Vietnam, and intensify bombings as long as the Vietnamese people have not accepted the U.S. conditions for negotiations."

The VNA account does acknowledge the passage in Tien's statement in which he affirmed the correctness of the 1 July PRG peace initiative, and spelled out the harsher demands under points one and two: a complete U.S. withdrawal and end to aggression would include an end to all acts of war against the Vietnamese people "under any form and any place" and an end to "all U.S. support and commitments" to the Thieu administration. Calling the two points "the main ones," Tien said they are "closely related points," and added that "only if the Nixon Administration responds to these points can peace be restored and can all U.S. military personnel, including those captured during the war in Vietnam, return to their families at an early date."

DRV delegate head Xuan Thuy also spelled out the first two points of the PRG peace initiative, but VNA inexplicably does not report this.* It says that Thuy "reiterated full support" for the proposal, "the two main and closely related points of which had been explained" by the PRG delegate.

AIR STRIKES AND POWS Xuan Thuy took issue with the President's 2 January interview in some detail, but the VNA account reports his remarks only briefly. For example, Thuy took exception to the President's justification of the U.S. air strikes on the basis that the DRV had violated the 1968 bombing understanding. Thuy reiterated the standard argument that the United States had "unconditionally" agreed to the 1968 bombing halt, and said that a 2 November 1968 DRV Government statement had reaffirmed this fact.

* The evolution of the hardened negotiating terms in statements by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Premier Pham Van Dong is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 November 1971, pages 11-13, 20 November, pages 5-8, and 8 December, pages 14-16.

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As earlier propaganda on the interview had done, Thuy also took exception to the President's claim that the U.S. strikes against the North were "very effective" and were aimed at "selected military targets." Thuy repeated the claim that U.S. planes bombed hospitals, schools, and populated areas and that from 17 to 30 December the North Vietnamese armed forces and people had downed 24 planes and captured a "number of pilots and wiped out a good number of others." He said that U.S. military circles "themselves" called the strikes "a failure."

Like the initial comment on the President's interview, the communist delegates at Paris ignored the exchange with CBS correspondent Dan Rather in which the President asserted that in Paris "the communists had totally rejected" the notion of a prisoner release if the United States set a withdrawal deadline.* Thuy did argue, and VNA reports, that it is U.S. policy that has caused U.S. militarymen to be captured, that the Nixon Administration's refusal to set a deadline for troop withdrawal and to stop backing the Thieu administration is the reason U.S. prisoners could not return to the United States in 1971, and that the United States is using the prisoner issue as a "pretext" to continue the war and cover up its crimes.

NHAN DAN ON
THE PRESIDENT

The first substantial Hanoi press comment on the President's 2 January interview came belatedly on the 7th in NHAN DAN** and there is some confusion in the media as to the exact nature of the article. A brief VNA English-language summary on the 7th described it as "a signed commentary", and VNA's review of the Hanoi press that day referred to it as a "lengthy" article. But Hanoi radio in its Mandarin-language service on the 10th uniquely identified it as a NHAN DAN Commentator*** article--in

* VNA did note on the 5th Senator McGovern's assertion that the President knew it was not true that U.S. negotiators in Paris had discussed with the North Vietnamese the question of total withdrawal in conjunction with prisoner release. See the 5 January TRENDS, pages 3-4.

** There was a passage on the interview in NHAN DAN's 4 January editorial which rounded up worldwide protests against the U.S. air strikes.

*** Commentator articles in NHAN DAN are normally broadcast by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese. A notable exception was the 22 August Commentator which reached a new level of venom in its anti-Chinese polemic. It was summarized by VNA and excerpted by Hanoi radio in Mandarin. See the

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suct the form in which press comment on Presidential pronouncements have normally come. Other available references to the article, however, in Hanoi's English-language broadcasts and in VNA's Vietnamese-language service for cadres, did not attribute it to Commentator.

According to the available versions of the article, it takes sharp issue with the President's statement in his interview that he always does more than he promises. As a count' argument it recalls that during his campaign for the Presidency he had promised to end the war promptly but in fact has intensified it during the past three years. And it said that his latest interview is connected with his desire to be President for another term.

Hanoi radio's Mandarin-language version of the article--also carried in VNA Vietnamese--reiterates the standard line that if the United States really wants to end the war of aggression, it must set a terminal date for the complete withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam. And it goes on to claim that the President in his interview revealed his intention to permanently keep a residual U.S. force in South Vietnam.

As broadcast in Mandarin, the article says flatly that on the night of the interview "many Americans were shocked by the fact that their own President had become a liar." But it then goes on to add only that he talked again and again about the same old prisoner of war issue, but that it is he who is responsible for the continued increase in the number of prisoners: "While talking loudly about peaceful deeds, he remained completely silent about when the last U.S. soldier would withdraw from Vietnam." Observing that the President glossed over such problems as the economy and social problems and concentrated on foreign policy, the article--as heard in Mandarin--stops short of mentioning the President's trip to Peking. It says:

In point of fact Nixon has vainly attempted to use diplomatic maneuvers to cover up and overcome his difficulties in other spheres. What is more important is the fact that the U.S. imperialists are still entertaining illusions about using the Nixon Doctrine to continue to play the role of international gendarme at lower costs.

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The version carried by VNA in Vietnamese to cadres then adds: "In addition, people also heard Nixon hail the summit conferences which in the past few years were opposed by him." The VNA Vietnamese account of the article then quotes passages on the Nixon Doctrine reminiscent of Hanoi's anti-Chinese polemic last summer in the wake of the 15 July announcement of the President's planned Peking trip. Most notably it revives the charge unique at that time that a main aim of the Nixon Doctrine is to split the socialist countries. According to VNA Vietnamese, the article says:

One of the most contradictory points in the Nixon Doctrine is the fact that the United States continues to want to force other countries to yield and to comply with its requests, while the United States itself has become weaker with each passing day. The United States continues to plan to expand its interventionist actions in the world and to step up its activities aimed at sowing dissension among socialist countries and at opposing the steadily growing strength of the socialist camp and the national liberation movement.

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PEKING NOTES PRESIDENT'S INTERVIEW, REPORTS PARIS SESSION

Peking first acknowledged President Nixon's remarks on Indochina in his 2 January TV interview in two NCNA reports on the 6th of LPA and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries. (Previously Peking had noted his remarks on the Middle East in NCNA reports on the 4th.) Peking commented on its own authority belatedly on 8 January with an NCNA commentary on both the President's statements and Secretary Rogers' 5 January TV interview, focusing on their justification of the bombings on the basis of the "so-called 'prisoners of war' problem."

In a notable departure from past practice, NCNA on the 8th reported the proceedings of the Paris session held two days earlier,* citing the communist delegates' criticisms of the "deceptive allegations" made by the President in his TV interview. Without indicating what the President said on the subject, the NCNA account quoted Xuan Thuy as charging that the Nixon Administration has misused the POW question in order to continue the war and to keep the Thieu regime in power. Thuy was quoted as saying that the U.S. troops and prisoners could not return home in 1971 because the Administration refused to respond to the PRG's seven points. NCNA also quoted the PRG delegate's statement that the seven-point plan is "fully correct."

The 8 January NCNA report on the President's and Secretary Rogers' interviews dismissed their arguments on the POW issue as "very preposterous" and pointed to the seven points as the basis for a settlement including the prisoner problem. The report predictably ignored the President's disclosure that the prisoner issue had been discussed with Chou En-lai. In addition to the POW question, NCNA's account of the secretary's interview also dealt with his remarks on continuing U.S. support for Saigon. Charging that the United States has emphasized the POW question for the sole purpose of "making it a pretext," NCNA said the essence of the question is U.S. unwillingness to give up support for the Saigon regime, as "admitted" by Rogers when he reaffirmed that the American purpose is to provide South Vietnam the opportunity to determine its own future.

* In the past Peking has reported statements by the communist delegates canceling forthcoming sessions of the Paris talks, but the only known precedent for the current report on a session's proceedings was Peking's coverage of the exceptional 1 July 1971 session at which the PRG's seven points were presented. NCNA reported that session and carried the text of the PRG statement.

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The NCNA commentary concluded by saying that the "Nixon Administration" came to power with promises to end the war and withdraw U.S. troops but that it has now demonstrated that it "has no intention of keeping its promises." But Peking's continuing avoidance of the strongest personal attacks on the President is illustrated by NCNA's failure to use language like that which it quoted the Vietnamese communist commentaries as having used when they condemned the President's "deceitful tricks" and "obdurate and bellicose stand."

Peking's reaction to the President's remarks on Indochina, including its account of the communist delegates' statements in Paris, reflects its concern to stress that the POW issue--and the Indochina question in general--must be settled with the Vietnamese communists and their allies in Indochina. By again citing the seven-point plan as the basis for a settlement and giving unusual publicity to the Paris forum, Peking has implicitly sought to reassure Hanoi over the effects of the President's visit to Peking--a reassurance especially timely in view of the President's reference to the POW issue in connection with the Kissinger-Chou talks.

USSR CONTINUES TO SCORE BOMBING OF DRV, PRESIDENT'S "THREATS"

Moscow's continuing condemnation of the 26-30 December heavy U.S. air strikes against the DRV is typified by a 4 January Mayevskiy PRAVDA article which cites various Western press commentaries to the effect that the United States is resorting to old, discredited methods of expanding the aggression to compensate for military failures, and points out that the gamble on "illusory" military victories has led Washington to "virtually sabotage" the Paris negotiations in an attempt to "pressure" Hanoi.

Commenting similarly on the bombings as an effort to compensate for the failure of Vietnamization, Col. Aleksey Leontyev in RED STAR on the 6th says that this effort to bring Hanoi to its knees also failed. The U.S. press itself admitted, Leontyev adds, that no significant damage was inflicted on the DRV, and the Americans encountered an unexpectedly strong rebuff from the DRV air defense forces. Leontyev says that there are no signs in Washington, however, of any intention to draw "realistic conclusions" from the defeats, with even Nixon's 2 January TV interview containing "threats" to resume

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the bombing. Leontyev cites the New York TIMES as saying that the captured pilots are the pretext for maintaining a "residual" force in Vietnam and the safety of the residual force is the pretext for continuing the bombing, but that the Thieu regime cannot survive without the bombings.

A 6 January TASS report of Secretary Rogers' TV interview the day before notes that he said that the United States would continue military and economic aid to the Saigon regime and that he tied the problem of U.S. troop withdrawal, among other things, with the preservation of the Saigon regime. Claiming that President Nixon in his TV interview failed to "justify" U.S. bombing, TASS' commentator Kharkov on the 6th ridicules as a mere "pretext" arguments regarding "defensive reaction." Kharkov says that Secretary Rogers clarified the President's statement when he connected the withdrawal of American troops with the preservation of the present regime in Saigon.

ATTACKS ON
PEKING

Moscow continues to charge that Sino-American developments encouraged the United States to make the bombing raids against the DRV and to point to Peking's "restrained" reaction to the attacks. Moscow has continued to ignore the PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the strikes except in Mandarin-language radio broadcasts. Commentators point out that the bombings coincided with the arrival in the PRC of the U.S. advance delegation preparing for President Nixon's visit. Leontyev, in his 6 January RED STAR article, cites comment from the U.S. press to document charges that Peking's "silence" encouraged the United States in the bombing. According to the New York POST, says Leontyev, Chou En-lai could have stopped the raids "by hinting that their initiator would not have received a hospitable reception in Peking."

Some comment again raises the specter of a behind-the-scenes deal on Vietnam to be made during the President's visit in Peking. The 6 January TASS report of Secretary Rogers' TV interview as well as a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 7th note that in reply to a question, Rogers expressed the opinion that the resumption of the bombing of the DRV would not adversely affect the President's forthcoming trip to Peking.

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A Kharkov TASS commentary on the 11th links the U.S. "refusal to hold serious talks" in Paris with hints in the U.S. press of "possibilities" opening up in connection with the President's visit to Peking. The New York TIMES on 7 January, says Kharkov, linked Nixon's trip with the possibility of the emergence of "chances" for compromise on the battlefield and at the Paris talks, and Kharkov interprets this to mean that the impression is being created that "certain quarters" are trying to discuss the Vietnam problem behind the backs of the Vietnamese. A brief Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the 8th says that some facts indicate a Sino-U.S. attempt to make a backstage deal on Vietnam, citing the Washington POST as pointing out that in his 2 January TV interview President Nixon "admitted" that Kissinger had talked with Chou about U.S. prisoners during his two visits to Peking. (The initial TASS report of President Nixon's interview had noted that he declared his intention to raise the question of American POWs during his visit to Peking, but did not, of course, acknowledge that he also said he had talked to Gromyko about the question and intended to discuss it during his visit to Moscow as well.)

Another Radio Peace and Progress Mandarin-language commentary on the 7th observes that the President "arrogantly" told the Vietnamese about "the do's-and-don'ts" in the treatment of U.S. prisoners and pointed to the example of the PRC which released two U.S. prisoners. A Radio Moscow commentary in Mandarin on the 5th, similarly referring to the PRC's release of two U.S. prisoners, speculates that Washington hopes Peking will "pressure" Hanoi to change its present stand on the POWs.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES

The DRV Foreign Ministry's first official protest against U.S. air strikes in the DMZ and North Vietnam in 1972 comes in the form of a spokesman's statement on 7 January which does not mention the sustained late December strikes against North Vietnam. The spokesman charges that "since 31 December to the present" U.S. planes, including B-52s, were sent "to repeatedly bomb and strafe" Huong Lap village and that U.S. artillery "from positions south of the demilitarized zone" and from U.S. ships was used in attacks against a "certain number of villages belonging to Vinh Linh area." The protest, oddly, does not identify the villages, but does assert, in routine fashion, that they are situated north of the 17th parallel inside the DMZ "belonging to DRV territory." (The U.S. command in Saigon announced on the 7th that heavy B-52 raids had been conducted in the DMZ the previous day, particularly in the southwestern portion.)

The protest also charges that U.S. planes "again bombed and strafed a certain number of localities belonging to Quang Binh Province" on 2 and 3 January and that on the 5th, U.S. planes "fired rockets at a locality belonging to Hoa Binh Province." (The U.S. Command on the 7th disclosed that two strikes had been made inside North Vietnam this year--both reportedly on the 5th. One strike was said to have been made 45 miles north of the DMZ, while the other "was within three flying minutes of Hanoi.")

The protest uses routine formulations in "sternly condemning the above acts of war" and demanding an end to all actions "grossly encroaching" upon the DRV's sovereignty and security.

DRV PREMIER'S OFFICE ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS ON TET OBSERVANCE

Hanoi radio on 8 January reported that the DRV premier's office had issued instructions on the celebration of the "Nham Ty" lunar new year (Tet). The broadcast said the instructions were to imbue the Tet festivities with "the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance spirit" in the face of the continued "bellicosity" of the United States, particularly the heavy air strikes against the DRV in December. The instructions call on all the northern armed forces and people to heighten their vigilance and "be ready to fight and

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defend the enemy in all circumstances and satisfactorily perform the great rear duty toward the great frontline while striving to build and consolidate the socialist North."

Appeals for vigilance have been a staple of the annual Tet instructions, but the current instructions differ from previous ones in giving attention to the antiaircraft task. They call on "administrative committees at all echelons to intensify the people's antiaircraft task and satisfactorily organize alert units" so that "night and day" they can maintain security and order, protect important buildings, maintain communications, and be constantly combat ready.

In recent years the premier's instructions on Tet have specified the number of days workers will have off to celebrate the occasion, but no mention of such holidays is contained in this year's instructions.

COMMUNIST MEDIA CONDEMN U.S. B-52 BOMBINGS IN LAOS

The use of B-52s to bomb the Plain of Jars was condemned in an NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement as well as in a letter to the Geneva conference cochairman from NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit on 3 January, and in an 8 January Souphanouvong letter to the Laotian king. The most recent official statement specifically protesting B-52 strikes was an NLHS Central Committee statement dated 28 September which condemned intensified bombings of southern Laos. Souphanouvong's letter to the king protested the "massive" dispatch of Vang Pao and Thai troops into the Sam Thong-Long Cheng area as well as the B-52 bombings, and said that there had been a similar offensive in late 1969.*

* In view of the intensive communist attacks in the area of Long Cheng, it is notable that Souphanouvong's letter presses the claim that "the whole of Xieng Khouang Province" has been controlled by the Lao Front and "Patriotic Neutralist" forces since 1961 and that the Sam Thong-Long Cheng region was "illegally" raided and captured "by the United States and its henchmen" after the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements. This point was not made in a Souphanouvong letter to the king released on 20 April 1971--also at the time of communist military pressure in the area--which similarly scored the dispatch of Thai troops to the Sam Thong-Long Cheng region.

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The Central Committee statement and the letter to the Geneva cochairmen charged that the bombings showed U.S. dismay over the retreat of Vang Pao, Vientiane, and Thai forces from the Plain, and pointed out that the raids took place after a visit to Vientiane of Admiral McCain, U.S. Pacific Forces Commander. The NLHS Central Committee spokesman, according to the Pathet Lao radio's report of the statement on the 4th, also warned that if the U.S. imperialists and their "lackeys" continue their military adventures they will be "heavily punished as they were in areas along Route 9 and other places." Both the documents repeated demands that the United States unconditionally cease the bombing of Lao territory in order to allow the Lao "parties concerned" to hold talks to solve the Lao problem peacefully.

In a 20 November letter to Souvanna Phouma reopening a two-year correspondence, Souphanouvong had reverted to this hard-line stand on an unconditional end to the bombing which had been adhered to by the NLHS prior to its 22 June 1971 proposal for a simultaneous bombing halt and cease-fire. He had repeated this position in another letter dated 16 December.* But in his current letter to the king, Souphanouvong said that the Lao problem must be settled by the Lao people themselves in accordance with the 6 March 1970 NLHS five-point solution and the 27 April and 22 June proposals.

Replying to Souphanouvong's 20 November letter, Souvanna Phouma on 27 November complained once again that Souphanouvong had remained silent about North Vietnamese aggression in Laos, and a 25 December letter he sent to the Geneva conference cochairmen also complained about DRV aggression in Laos.

VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS The Vietnamese communists supported the NLHS, as is customary, with PRG and DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, issued on 7 and 9 January respectively, both scorning the "Nixon Administration" for increasing the use of U.S. aircraft, "especially B-52s," to bomb the Plain of Jars. The PRG statement said that the actions once again showed the Nixon Administration's "obduracy and bellicosity," and the DRV statement, like that of the NLHS, recalled the visit to Vientiane of Admiral McCain. Both statements called the bombing a violation of the Geneva agreements on Laos and said that they "expose" Souvanna Phouma's "slander" of the DRV.

* Souphanouvong's letters are discussed in the TRENDS of 1 December 1971, pages 9-10 and 22 December 1971, pages 6-7.

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PEKING Peking supported the NLHS with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Peking has similarly supported other NLHS Central Committee statements with press comment, most recently with a 31 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial in support of an NLHS protest of intensified "nibbling attacks" against the "liberated zone." The U.S.-supported South Vietnamese incursion into Laos last February, of course, had prompted government and foreign ministry statements as well as a flurry of press comment. But there has been no official Peking protest since then.

Denouncing the "barbarous bombing" by the B-52s in the Plain of Jars, the current Commentator article expressed the "Chinese people's" condemnation of the "towering crime committed by U.S. imperialism." Commentator praised the Lao patriots for having smashed "U.S. imperialist" attacks over the past year scoring "one splendid victory after another," especially the recent gain in the Plain of Jars-Muong Suoi area. It concluded with the assertion that the Lao people are determined to further strengthen their "militant unity" with the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples to "seize new and greater victories" and expressed the Chinese people's "firm support" for the Lao people's struggle. Consistent with Peking's generally circumspect treatment of President Nixon since the invitation to him to visit the PRC, the Commentator article did not echo the Vietnamese communists' attacks on the "Nixon Administration."

MOSCOW Moscow as usual offered no authoritative comment, the available Soviet reaction pegged specifically to the B-52 raids being limited to TASS summaries of the NLHS and Vietnamese communist statements.

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DRV'S "CHIEN THANG" ON WAR, PRESIDENT'S "TRAVEL DIPLOMACY"

Hanoi's persistent argument that the tide of battle is turning in its favor was pressed in a series of articles published in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 11 to 17 December under the signature of "Chien Thang" (Victor), a pseudonym which has appeared over many authoritative DRV military articles in the past. The article contained some of the elements present in subsequent Vietnamese communist year-end propaganda which insisted that the balance of forces had shifted against the allies in 1971.* Chien Thang also made apparent veiled allusions to the forthcoming visits by President Nixon to Peking and Moscow when he deprecated the President for attempting to use his travels to distract public attention from the problem of the Vietnam war. The last known article attributed to Chien Thang, published in the 3 August 1971 issue of the army paper during Hanoi's polemic with Peking on the Presidential trip, laid the theoretical basis for the polemic by defending Vietnam's "correct" attitude toward "U.S. imperialism" and indicting all who would moderate their struggle against the United States.** The December series of articles is not known to have been broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese, but on 12 January Hanoi's Mandarin-language program carried the fifth installment in the series which dealt with the pacification effort.

Chien Thang began by reiterating the view voiced in other Hanoi commentaries in recent months that the peak of the war has passed. Stressing that "we defeated the Americans when their force was at its strongest," he held that the current situation is "very favorable to us" and called for great efforts to be made to "win new victories." While Chien Thang pointed out the importance of main-force action in affecting the course of the war--a line pressed since the "strategic victories" during Lam Son 719 a year ago--he did not give one-sided attention to this factor. In a balanced appraisal which would seem to envisage both large-scale attacks and the conservation of forces for a prolonged conflict, he held that the communists, in their "strengthened" position, can "deal strong blows or fight protractedly."

* For a discussion of the year-end propaganda, see the 5 January TRENDS, pages 18-20.

** Chien Thang's 3 August article was discussed in the 18 August 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-4.

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ALLUSIONS TO
NIXON VISITS

Chien Thang seemed to be alluding to President Nixon's projected visits to Peking and Moscow when he cited a Western paper as observing that the President "took advantage of his trips" to distract public attention from Vietnam.* He went on to state that the President gained nothing since "the strength of the struggle in Vietnam" will again bring this problem "onto the stage." Earlier, in another possible allusion to the forthcoming visits, Chien Thang scored "feverish diplomatic activities" by the last two U.S. administrations, including "sending politicians of all ranks, including the President and Vice President, to establish bilateral or trilateral contacts in the hope of coping with public opinion and extricating the United States from isolation."

HANOI, MOSCOW HAIL RAISING OF DRV-INDIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

HANOI Hanoi announced the decision to raise its relations with India to ambassadorial level "as of 7 January" in a DRV Foreign Ministry communique on the 7th. The brief communique noted that the exchange of ambassadors "will be carried out in the near future." Immediately after the release of the communique DRV media carried a message from DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to his Indian counterpart declaring that the action "represents a fine developing step of the old friendship and solidarity between the Vietnamese and Indian peoples and is in accordance with the aspirations of our two peoples."

On 11 January, a NHAN DAN commentary takes exception to the U.S. and Saigon reaction to the announcement. The commentary cites Western sources in saying that the U.S. representative in India delivered a memorandum voicing dissatisfaction with India's establishment of an embassy in North Vietnam while maintaining a consulate in Saigon. It notes that India "firmly turned down" the U.S. protest. Following the U.S. lead, says the commentary, the Saigon administration "took stronger action" by officially protesting to the Indian Government, "stating that it no longer agrees to India being ICC chairman, and refusing to let Mr. Ray,

* Hanoi is not known to have explicitly mentioned the President's trip to Peking except in an article in the November issue of THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS)--a journal of the party's Propaganda and Training Department, thought to be written for lower-level cadre. See the 5 January TRENDS, page 4.

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head of the ICC, come to Saigon to assume his duties." NHAN DAN calls these "stupid and arrogant reactions by the U.S.-puppets," and points out that India is an independent and sovereign country.

As if hinting that India should next accord recognition to the PRG, NHAN DAN claims that a "large majority" of the Indian people support the Vietnamese people's "just struggle" and express sympathy for "their good will and correct stand" as demonstrated by the PRG seven-point peace proposal. More pointedly, the paper asserts that "in the eyes of the Indian people the representatives of the South Vietnamese cannot be the dirty lackeys in Saigon, but the NFLSV and PRG." It adds that this was "clearly reflected in the warm reception" of the NFLSV delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien in 1969,* and the visit of PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh in July 1970 as the guest of the Indian foreign minister.** (During her visit, Mme. Binh reportedly pressed India for recognition of the PRG; following her India stay she visited Ceylon, which did grant full diplomatic recognition to the PRG.)

NHAN DAN declares that the Indian and Vietnamese people "are closely united and support each other in their struggle against the colonialists and for national salvation." Noting that even U.S. allies have "one after the other established diplomatic relations with the DRV," the paper calls the raising of DRV diplomatic relations with India an inevitable development in the friendly relations between the two peoples "in conformity with the practical situation in Vietnam."

Addressing the question of India's ICC role, NHAN DAN says the "U.S.-puppets' attitude is all the more contemptible" because they want to take advantage of this opportunity to deny India its role in the ICC and to prevent the Indian delegate from taking up his post at the ICC headquarters in Saigon. It charges that the United States and Saigon have little respect for the ICC, claiming, as an example, that "not long ago they mobilized hooligans in Saigon to ransack the ICC headquarters."

* A joint NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien made a "friendship visit" to India from 13 December 1969 to 8 January 1970. See the TRENDS of 14 January 1970, pages 7-8, and 17 December 1969, page 10.

** For a discussion of communist comment on Mme. Binh's visit to India and Ceylon see the TRENDS of 5 August 1970, page 8; 29 July, pages 11-12; and 22 July, pages 8-9.

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After detailing various alleged allied violations of the 1954 Geneva agreements, the commentary says that "against this background the plots of the U.S.-puppets against the ICC and the Indian delegate only further disclose their stubborn and warlike nature. The U.S.-puppets' arrogant attitude clearly proves that they are caught in great confusion and passivity."

MOSCOW Moscow routinely and favorably publicized the Indian-DRV decision to raise diplomatic relations to ambassadorial level, TASS promptly reporting the announcement on the 7th and noting that India said it supports the "just struggle" of the DRV people. The following day TASS reported that U.S. State Department spokesman Bray expressed dissatisfaction with the Indian decision which, he said, was taken at an "especially unsuitable time." TASS asserted, inaccurately, that Bray did not specify what he meant by an unsuitable time, ignoring his explanation that it was at a time when the Vietnamese were taking a particularly tough line in Paris. TASS instead pointed out that the decision came when the United States was bombing the DRV and taking a sharply anti-Indian position in connection with the Hindustan conflict. Moscow has not been heard to mention India's ICC role or the statement of the GVN Foreign Minister refusing entry to the new Indian ICC representative because of India's non-neutral attitude toward Vietnam.

TASS has carried reports of the favorable response to the decision among the Indian public, citing the Indian press as asserting that the move strengthens Indian-DRV friendship and assists in the establishment of peace in Indochina. On the 9th TASS reported India's rejection of the U.S. protest against the decision.

Limited Moscow comment includes a PRAVDA dispatch from Hanoi correspondent Serbin, briefly summarized by TASS on the 10th, which praised the DRV's diplomatic success, noted that DRV prestige was steadily increasing, and pointed to the failure of the U.S. policy of "isolating" the DRV. Implying that India took the decision in retaliation for the U.S. posture on the Indian-Pakistani conflict, a Moscow commentary broadcast in English to South Asia on the 10th said the decision stemmed from the recent Hindustan conflict which revealed that Washington pursues the same aggressive strategy there as it does in Indochina, relying for its political objectives on "reactionary military regimes" and sending warships to the area.

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Against the background of Peking's silence on the raising of Indian-DRV relations, some Moscow broadcasts in Mandarin took the opportunity for further attacks on Peking's "splittist" policy. A commentary on the 8th called the Indian-DRV decision an important step in consolidating the "anti-imperialist front" of the South Asian people, and contrasted this with the "perilous" Chinese splittist policy, which it called virtually "a common policy" with the U.S. aim of setting Asians against Asians. An 11 January commentary, remarking that the decision on ambassadorial relations comes against the background of the Hindustan conflict, pointed out that Peking sided with the United States in "slanderizing" India for aggression against East Pakistan. Although Peking used "fabrications" to try to reduce India's prestige and disrupt its friendly relations with other Asian countries, said the commentary, the agreement with the DRV shows that this effort will fail.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING ACCORDS HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION TO U.S. ADVANCE PARTY

In its publicity for the U.S. advance party preparing for President Nixon's visit next month, Peking has again signaled that the plans for the visit remain on course regardless of the Chinese leadership purge or developments in the international arena. Though the announced purpose of the advance party's trip was only to make "technical arrangements" for the President's visit, Peking reported on the 6th that Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying* had "a conversation" with the Americans, and the Chinese press carried a photograph of Chou with members of the party.

In addition to this high-level gesture, Peking announced that the group was feted by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei after arrival in Peking on 3 January and that it held talks with Chi on the following day. Rounding out Peking's coverage, NCNA announced the group's departure for home on the 10th after visits to Hangchow and Shanghai, where the Americans were entertained by second-level provincial officials. NCNA provided some details on the group's week-long activities.

Apart from these and earlier announcements on preparations for the President's visit and occasional pickups of foreign comment, there has been no direct Chinese discussion of the upcoming visit in the main PRC media.** The only direct commentary on the visit from Peking appears in the latest issue of the illustrated monthly CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, published in five foreign languages (including English and Russian) by the China Welfare Institute. Entitled "The Beginning of a New Era," the article is attributed to Soong Ching-ling, chairman of the institute and a vice chairman of the PRC. Judging from a 10 January REUTERS dispatch from Peking quoting the article, it interprets the President's visit as the result of a changed U.S. awareness of a need to come to

* Yeh, the ranking military figure currently appearing in public and the leader who enjoyed the biggest rise in the Peking hierarchy after the purge of Lin Piao and other military leaders, acted as the host for the second Kissinger mission last October.

** The most authoritative Chinese explanation of the invitation to the President took an allegorical form in the ideological journal RED FLAG No. 9 last year. See the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 19-22.

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terms with the "reality of China." Noting that the news of the forthcoming visit has "aroused excitement throughout the entire world," the article makes a pitch to the world at large--the audience for this periodical--by stating that the "new realization" by the United States of the reality of China "must be true for many others."

Like the magazine which her organization publishes, Soong Ching-ling--the widow of Sun Yat-sen and the sister of Madame Chiang Kai-shek--is not a major or particularly authoritative source of comment. Virtually inactive in public affairs in recent years, she was reported to have attended the 10 January memorial ceremony for Chen I. Her last previous reported appearance was on 17 December 1970 when she received the credentials of the new Bulgarian ambassador. The protocol duties of acting chief of state have otherwise been performed by Tung Pi-wu, also a PRC vice chairman.

PRESIDENT'S TV INTERVIEW Consistent with Peking's restraint in its treatment of President Nixon in anticipation of the summit meeting, Chinese reaction to the President's 2 January television interview has sidestepped sensitive bilateral issues in Sino-U.S. relations while attacking the President's remarks on the Middle East and Indochina. Peking has not mentioned his comments on Taiwan or on relations with the PRC.

Chinese media's first reaction to the interview appeared on the 4th in the form of two NCNA dispatches reprovingly citing his remarks on the military balance in the Middle East and the sale of jets to Israel. Subsequent NCNA reports took issue with his comments on Indochina.* There has been no reaction to the interview above the level of NCNA reports.

* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

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CHINA

MAO, OTHER LEADERS APPEAR FOR CHEN I FUNERAL CEREMONY

Chen I, foreign minister and former Politburo member, died as a result of intestinal cancer on 6 January, according to an NCNA announcement on the 10th. Mao departed from his usual practice to attend the memorial service in person; prior to the cultural revolution such ceremonies were normally chaired by Liu Shao-chi.

Chen I had been attacked by Red Guards in 1967, but he was defended by Chou En-lai. Although he was not reelected to the Politburo in 1969, he retained his Central Committee rank and, like other former Politburo members Hsu Hsiang-chien and Nieh Jung-chen, he was given a protocol rank immediately following the Politburo as a vice-chairman of the party's military commission. The NCNA obituary indicates that he retained his various state offices, including the Foreign Ministry, but he seems to have been inactive for some time because of illness. His last appearance was on May Day this year.

All active Politburo members stationed in Peking except Yao Wen-yuan attended the ceremony or sent a wreath. Among inactive members whose standing has been uncertain since the Lin Piao affair, Kang Sheng and Chu Te were listed as having sent wreaths. No wreaths, however, were noted as having been sent by Peking chief Hsieh Fu-chih or old Marshal Liu Po-cheng.

The memorial oration was delivered by Chou En-lai, who spoke warmly of Chen I's merits while revealing nothing new concerning his long career. Chou closed his address with a standard warning against "arrogance and rashness."

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PRC NUCLEAR TEST

ANNOUNCEMENT INTIMATES FLEXIBILITY ON DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The 9 January NCNA announcement that the PRC conducted a nuclear test on 7 January marks the 11th Chinese test to be acknowledged by Peking since 1964.* The announcement is most notable for its hint of flexibility--earlier intimated by PRC UN delegate Chiao Kuan-hua in November--in the Chinese attitude toward disarmament negotiations. Where Peking in the past has pressed its long-standing proposal for a world "summit" conference to discuss nuclear disarmament, the current test announcement asserts that the Chinese Government has "all along stood for the convening of a world conference to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons," and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. As earlier announcements had done, the current one concludes that Peking is "willing to strive for this goal together with the other peoples and peaceloving countries of the world."

Two other points in the announcement are noteworthy, although seemingly less significant than the passage on a "world conference." The announcement omits any reference to the "defensive" nature of Chinese nuclear tests, a point which has been religiously made in all previous test announcements. (The current announcement does note routinely that Chinese tests are "necessary and limited," and it repeats the standard affirmation that the PRC will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.) The announcement is also notable for its observation that Chinese tests are for the purpose of "breaking the nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail by the two superpowers," a paraphrase of language used by Chinese delegation member Chen Chu in speaking to the test-ban question on 9 December 1971 before the UN General Assembly's first committee. With three exceptions, all previous Chinese test announcements have included indictments of both the United States and the USSR by name. The announcement of the second test, in May 1965, mentioned only the United States; the 4 October 1969 statement on the 8th and 9th announced tests

* Two tests detected by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission have gone unannounced by Peking--those of 24 December 1967 and 14 October 1970.

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referred to "U.S. imperialism and social imperialism"; and the unusually brief statement on the 10th announced test, on 18 November 1971, contained no criticism of either the U.S. or Soviet positions on nuclear weaponry.

CONFERENCE PROPOSAL Less than six weeks before the current announcement, Chiao Kuan-hua, in an address before the General Assembly on 24 November 1971, had attacked the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference, arguing that it had no clear aim and that it would "inevitably become a permanent club for endless discussions that solve no substantive problems." Endorsing the PRC summit conference proposal, Chiao went on to state that "we are also prepared to hear and consider different opinions" on the level of a world conference and on the question of whether it should be held inside or outside the United Nations. Ultimately, the Chinese delegation, with reservations, cast an affirmative vote on 16 December 1971 for a resolution sponsored by Mexico, Romania, and 25 other countries which invited all states to communicate to the UN secretary general, before 31 August 1972, their views and suggestions relating to a world disarmament conference.*

Background: The proposal for a summit-level conference was first surfaced by Peking in 1963 in a PRC Government statement following the initialing of the partial test-ban treaty. The government statement announcing the first Chinese nuclear test in October 1964 revised the proposal to include the suggestion that as a first step the conference reach an agreement that nuclear weapons should not be used. The announcements on the second and third tests--in May 1965 and May 1966--had endorsed the summit-level conference, but it has not been mentioned in subsequent test announcements. The proposal disappeared from elite Peking propaganda after July 1966 and was not resurrected until November 1970. Since then, the proposal has been mentioned with some frequency, and apparently in only one instance--the Chiao speech--was there a suggestion that a conference could be held at lower than a summit level.

* For a review of the PRC-Soviet confrontation at the General Assembly on the question of a world disarmament conference, see the TRENDS for 29 December 1971, pages 24-27.

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MOSCOW In the pattern of its treatment of the last PRC nuclear test in November, Moscow reported the 7 January detonation in advance of the NCNA announcement. Citing the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, TASS on the 8th said the PRC had conducted an atmospheric test at its Lop Nor site. The same TASS item went on to note that the mayor of Hiroshima sent a telegram of protest to Mao Tse-tung. And TASS and Moscow radio have subsequently played on the radiation hazards resulting from this and earlier experiments.

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DISARMAMENT

IZVESTIYA PLEADS FOR U.S. RESTRAINT IN MILITARY PREPARATIONS

Moscow has devoted only negligible propaganda to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which resumed in Vienna on 4 January after a brief holiday break. But there are some notable passages in an article in the 6 January IZVESTIYA by V. Osipov, which is not broadcast by Radio Moscow or summarized by TASS. Treating disarmament as "the most important problem of our times," Osipov routinely voiced the hope that "positive, concrete results" would emerge from the 20 May agreement--which stated that the SALT negotiators in 1971 would work toward agreements on both offensive and defensive weaponry.

Osipov pointedly went on to express hope that the United States and its allies will show "at least some kind of restraint in the general scope of their military preparations." According to him, such restraint "would promote the establishment of the necessary trust between states and possibly a more productive discussion of the disarmament problem." This passage in turn is followed by Osipov's observation that the USSR for its part--and in contrast to the United States--has for two successive years not increased its defense expenditures. Osipov concluded by expressing concern over both the quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the U.S. military potential through, among other developments, the perfecting of submarine-based offensive weaponry and the fitting of Minuteman missiles with MIRV's.

Press comment over the past year on SALT--including the 3 February V. Shestov article in PRAVDA, the 7 July V. Viktorov article in the same paper, and RED STAR articles on 13 and 16 July by Col. V. Kharich--has assailed U.S. efforts to strengthen its military potential. The same comment has routinely stressed that any agreement at SALT must not give one-sided advantages. But it has stopped short of any plea for restraint as now expressed by Osipov. Such a plea at this juncture could be reflective of increasing pressure from the Soviet military establishment.

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ALBANIA

TIRANA DEFENDS PRC ON SOUTH ASIA BUT WARNS OF U.S. PLOTS

Reacting to Soviet bloc charges that Peking betrayed the national liberation movement by its stand on the Indian-Pakistani conflict and by its collusion with the United States, Tirana has come to the defense of its ally by undertaking a counterattack in the form of a lengthy editorial in the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT on 7 January. The editorial predictably absolves the Chinese of any blame for the conflict in South Asia and puts the onus on the Soviets for "instigating and supporting the Indian aggression" for their own expansionist aims. Against the background of President Nixon's impending visit to Peking, the Albanian paper insists that the Chinese still consider the United States "the main enemy"--a position that Peking's propaganda clearly implies is now occupied by the Soviet Union.

Despite offering such assurances of Peking's unabated anti-imperialist zeal, Albanian misgivings over the course of Sino-American relations seem reflected in another ZERI I POPULLIT article on the same day. Reacting to President Nixon's 2 January interview on CBS, the Albanian article abuses the President in personal terms and pointedly warns communists against new U.S. "plots" against other Asian countries, specifically mentioning the problem of Taiwan. The Albanian reaction contrasts with the restraint shown by Peking, which has avoided provocative attacks on the President and ignored his television remarks on Taiwan.

ZERI I POPULLIT EDITORIAL Referring to the Soviet bloc's anti-Chinese polemics on the Indian-Pakistani conflict as "orchestrated" by Moscow, the ZERI I POPULLIT editorial dismisses as "an unprecedented absurdity" the "revisionist" claim that the war represented a national liberation struggle. Arguing that Moscow is not really concerned with the fate of the national liberation movement, the editorial says that Soviet support for Indian "aggression" against Pakistan was motivated by its efforts to further dominate India and by its larger plan to form a new anti-Chinese bloc. In contrast, the Albanian paper defends Peking's stand on the conflict as "correct and consistent" and one motivated by the "interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan."

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Seeking to counter Soviet and East European charges of U.S.-Chinese "collusion" on the Indian-Pakistan conflict, the editorial calls such allegations "lies" and goes on to contrive a tortuous argument that the United States was actually colluding with the Soviet Union during the conflict and only "feigned" support for Pakistan as an aid to India and Moscow. Thus, the editorial says, the U.S. stand enabled Soviet propagandists to claim that the United States and the PRC had taken a common stand on the issue. (NCNA reported the ZERI I POPULLIT editorial on the 9th, but it deleted the passage on U.S.-Chinese collusion.)

Against the background of Soviet bloc charges that Peking has abandoned the class approach to foreign policy by its rapprochement with the United States, the Albanian editorial insists that the PRC continues to adhere to Marxist-Leninist positions and still considers "U.S. imperialism the number one enemy of the peoples." In a reassurance possibly intended for Hanoi, the editorial defensively adds that the PRC is "a determined enemy of U.S. imperialism and fights bravely with all its force against U.S. attempts to extend domination in Asia and in the world." The paper concludes with a call for increased communist vigilance in the world movement to cope with the attacks of "the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet social imperialists." Aside from such general warnings to be wary of the United States, the editorial makes no allusion to President Nixon's Peking trip, which Tirana has reported only briefly and factually.

WARNINGS OF U.S. "PLOTS" Albanian misgivings over the trip, however, seem to show through in the ZERI I POPULLIT article on the President's CBS interview. In contrast to Peking's restraint, the Albanian article refers to the President as "a war criminal" in connection with Vietnam and, most notably, cautions communists against U.S. "plans and plots against other countries and peoples of Asia"--a clear warning to the Chinese not to be taken in by the United States. In this context the article says that the President "reaffirmed his known hostile policy against the PRC in insisting on the 'two Chinas' plot or of one China and one Taiwan." Assuming an air of confidence in its ally's reliability, the article goes on to predict that nothing will come of the new plot because "the Chinese people are firmly determined to liberate Taiwan."

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Significantly, the article then recalls Enver Hoxha's warning at the sixth Albanian party congress in November 1971 that the United States is "aggressive in essence" and remains "unchanged." Hoxha's warning at the congress came in the wake of Chinese propaganda attempts to justify the invitation to the President as part of an effort to isolate the Soviet Union as the main enemy. Hoxha in sharp contrast argued against flexible tactics in the struggle against the United States on the grounds that Washington and Moscow are equally dangerous and aggressive. Since they are involved in a counterrevolutionary alliance against the national liberation movement, he concluded, the struggle against them is "indivisible."*

* Hoxha's speech and initial Albanian reaction to the announcement of Peking's invitation to the President are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 November 1971, pages 18-22.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN

MOSCOW EXPLOITS ANDERSON PAPERS; ALLIES RECOGNIZE BANGLADESH

While the Soviet propaganda machinery has been running in high gear to exploit the secret papers released by columnist Jack Anderson, four of Moscow's allies took the lead in granting the first recognition to Bangladesh from among the communist countries. The GDR, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Poland recognized the new regime on 11 and 12 January. Moscow was prompt in welcoming the initial recognition, by East Germany, applying to this event the theme of support for the national liberation movement. According to a Soviet broadcast to South Asia on the 11th, recognition "of the new republic is a natural act on the part of socialist Germany The great alliance of the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement has now, indeed, become a decisive factor in international development. Recognition of Bangladesh by the GDR is another step forward in strengthening this alliance."

Moscow has taken the occasion of the sixth anniversary this month of the Tashkent agreement--in which the Soviets mediated the previous Indian-Pakistani war--to seek to redress the imbalance resulting from its wholehearted support for the Indians in the recent conflict. A Soviet commentary broadcast to South Asia on 10 January recalled the spirit of Tashkent while acknowledging that many things had changed on the subcontinent. The commentary cited Kosygin's statement on the fifth anniversary, in messages to the leaders of India and Pakistan, that "even the most complicated problems in relations can be solved if both sides show statesmanship and good will." What matters now, the commentary concluded, is not the form of organizing negotiations but the readiness to conduct talks. A similar broadcast on 7 January recalled the Tashkent agreement when noting Mrs. Gandhi's "extremely important comment that India has no territorial ambitions either to the west or to the east of its own borders."

BANGLADESH CP Moscow has offered low-keyed propaganda support for the Bangladesh Communist Party in reportage citing its leaders' call for unity among the political forces in the new regime. TASS reported the opening, on 31 December, of

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the Dacca central office of the Bangladesh Communist Party, calling it the "first legal institution of the central body" of the party. On 5 January, in a broadcast to South Asia, a Moscow commentator said that the solution of the difficult problems of the new nation will require the cohesion and unity of all parties, "as the leaders of the Bangladesh Communist Party, Moni Singh and Abdus Salam, have emphasized." Moscow quoted Abdus Salam further: "This is especially important, considering the attempts of foreign reactionaries, Washington and Peking above all, to undermine the freedom gained by the East Bengali people." On 7 January, TASS reported on a resolution of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI) which noted "the selfless participation of the communists of East Pakistan in the liberation struggle."

The two leaders cited by Moscow were identified last year by pro-CPSU parties as leaders of the Communist Party of East Pakistan. (In the past Moscow was secretive in referring to this party.) Moni Singh was identified as one of the party's leaders by the British CP organ MORNING STAR in a 22 April 1971 article. According to the CPI organ NEW AGE, Abdus Salam, then identified as "General Secretary of the Communist Party of East Pakistan (Bangla Desh)," was one of eight foreign delegates addressing the closing rally of the CPI Ninth Congress last October. He said at that time that his party had "for the last 23 years actively participated in all the popular democratic struggles and had made its contribution to those." He praised the aid given by the CPI, hailed the Indian-Soviet treaty, and noted that his party was included in the consultative committee then recently formed by the Bangla Desh Government in exile. This committee also included the Awami League, the National Awami Party, the National Awami Party of Bhashani, and the National Congress. Salam welcomed the formation of this committee and repeated his appeal, which has been part of the party's program since May 1971, for creation of a national liberation front to lead the struggle. He condemned any effort to bypass unity on the grounds "we are the biggest party"--a slap at the Awami League.

ANDERSON PAPERS

The secret documents released by Jack Anderson serve as the peg for extensive Moscow propaganda, to home and foreign audiences, charging Washington with "double-dealing and cynicism" in regard to the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Summations of the documents and Anderson's columns serve as a backdrop to allegations that the deployment of U.S. naval forces in the Bay of Bengal was deliberately "provocative" and that U.S. moves in the United Nations were blatantly "cynical."

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U.S. policy on Indochina is frequently brought into the argumentation, as in a 9 January commentary to South Asia that observed: "The sensational exposure by . . . Anderson has shown the world how closely the situation on the Indian subcontinent has been brought to a repetition of Vietnam." There are also claims that the release of the documents reveals that the United States is "in collusion with China" because of the President's eagerness to make a success of his trip to Peking--although here it is mostly a matter of Moscow quoting non-Soviet comment to this effect rather than making the charge directly.

Peking has not mentioned the documents.

DECLINING PEKING PROPAGANDA CITES NAGA INSURGENCY IN INDIA

In its dwindling amount of attention to the South Asian situation, Peking has continued to try to capitalize on the obloquy incurred by India in the international community while raising the threat of Chinese fishing in the troubled waters of Indian nationality problems. An NCNA dispatch from the United Nations on 8 January quoted the PRC delegate at the Economic and Social Council as strongly opposing Indian participation in the council session's committees. Arguing that India had "trampled upon and dismembered a sovereign country" and has refused to implement the Security Council resolution on troop withdrawal, the Chinese delegate claimed that it would be "a big mockery to the United Nations if such a country which has trampled upon the purposes and principles of the UN Charter" were permitted to take part in the committees.

Playing on India's internal vulnerability, Peking on 4 January offered its first propaganda support in more than a year for the "protracted armed struggle" of the "Naga people's armed forces" in eastern India. Citing Indian sources reporting recent battles, NCNA claimed that the Indian Government is "deeply worried" about the Naga armed struggle. NCNA also charged that "Indian reactionaries" were suppressing the Santhal minority in Bihar State, citing a dispute between landowners and tribal sharecroppers reminiscent of the origins of the Maoist Naxalite movement in West Bengal. However, Peking has not mentioned the Naxalites or the Maoist Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist in the recent past. In another reference to nationality problems, NCNA on 30 December quoted a Japanese paper as saying the development of Bengalese nationalism will have an impact on "India's secession-inclined nationalities."

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Peking had raised the nationality question in the government statement of 16 December, which reminded the Indians that they had a nationality problem "whose complexity and acuteness are rarely seen elsewhere in the world." A similar warning was conveyed by Chou En-lai the next day when he called the fall of Dacca "the starting point of endless strife on the South Asian subcontinent." In following up the warning with propaganda on the Nagas, Peking broke a long period of silence on this subject extending back to September 1970. During the period in which Peking scaled down its propaganda support for armed insurgencies in neighboring countries, India among other countries having troubled relations with the PRC was the beneficiary of Peking's moves to normalize its relations in the international community. In this context, the renewal of inflammatory propaganda on the nationality and insurgency questions serves as a warning to India against its close alliance with the Soviet Union.

Peking's toughened stance regarding the U.S. naval task force in the Indian Ocean was reflected in a 9 January NCNA report on the naval activities of the two superpowers in that region. Entitled "Scramble for South Asian Subcontinent and Indian Ocean Intensifies Between Two Overlords," the report is pegged to U.S. Defense Department spokesman Friedheim's announcement that the U.S. task force would remain indefinitely in the Indian Ocean. NCNA takes its account of Soviet-U.S. naval rivalry in the area back to 1965, when "Soviet revisionist social imperialism" began to send its fleets to the Indian Ocean. "All indications show that the scramble between the two overlords for the area will become fiercer in the days to come," NCNA concludes. There is no reference to a threat to Chinese interests.

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URUGUAY

HAVANA DENOUNCES VOTE, SUPPORTS BROAD FRONT AND TUPAMAROS

Havana has alleged that the 28 November Uruguayan elections occurred in a government-promoted repressive and violent atmosphere and involved large-scale voting fraud and tallying irregularities. The Broad Front, a coalition of leftist forces including the Uruguayan Communist Party and tacitly supported by the urban-based Tupamano guerrillas, ran a weak third, receiving approximately 18 percent of the total vote according to still incomplete and unofficial counts. Cuban comment on the postelection situation foresees "a hardline policy on the part of the 'Pacheco-less Pachecoist' government" of apparent President-elect Juan Maria Bordaberry, a continuation of the political activities of the Broad Front, and a resumption of antigovernment activities on the part of the Tupamaros. Castro's comments on the postelection situation, in Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, have not been publicized by Havana media.

POSTELECTION SITUATION Laying the groundwork for Havana's subsequent accusations of fraud and repression, limited Cuban coverage of the electoral campaign stressed the government-created "atmosphere of violence" in which it was conducted and reported government-supported threats against and repression of Broad Front campaign activities, such as armed attacks on Broad Front political meetings and the knife attack on Broad Front presidential candidate Liber Seregni. In the same vein, initial Cuban reportage of the events of election day and the first indications of voter preferences juxtaposed reports of the ruling Colorado Party's lead--and thus the apparent victory of President Pacheco Areco's handpicked successor, Bordaberry--with charges by the Broad Front and the Uruguayan Communist Party's organ, EL POPULAR, of serious voting irregularities, harassment, and fraud.

Postelection commentaries have emphasized Seregni's charge that the elections were "the dirtiest in the history of Uruguay." Propagandists have contended that "emergency security measures, a virtual state of siege," "violence against the left by fascist bands enjoying police protection," "psychological pressures by the mass media," and "the threatening presence on the border of Brazilian troops" contributed to the Broad Front's loss.

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Stressing that "cowligarch" Bordaberry--minister of agriculture under Pacheco--is a minority president, Havana has pointed out that "a Bordaberry government is not an enigma" since he has "declared himself an unconditional follower of Pacheco Areco's policies." Quoting his alleged statement that his "ideological identity is with the Brazilian Government," PRENSA LATINA on 9 December reported that he has "caused consternation throughout the local political sector" with his labeling of the university as "a center for communist training" and his charge that the Uruguayan church "has made serious political mistakes, and I hope they are corrected." Pointing out that the election results are still not final, PRENSA LATINA on 27 December portrayed Bordaberry's closest rival in the vote count, the Blanco Party's Wilson Ferreyra Aldunate, as "more intelligent" than Bordaberry and suggested that, if elected, "he will proceed much more ably and dangerously." Elaborating, PRENSA LATINA said that he will "operate a repressive apparatus that is more selective" and "try to introduce certain reforms--including a capitalist agrarian reform--to modernize government structures and allay popular discontent."

Havana views the Broad Front as a continuing political force in Uruguay. A Havana television commentator on 2 December suggested that "everything seems to indicate that there will be a polarization of political forces and an intensification of the problems" of Uruguay and that the Front "could become a deciding political force supported by the combative action of the people in the streets." Announcing a Broad Front decision to "regroup to continue its struggle," Havana radio on 18 December opined that the Front's "speed in undertaking new political tasks is a blow to the rightist sectors, which considered that the Broad Front was a transitory union of forces to win political posts." PRENSA LATINA on 8 January transmitted a Broad Front plenary message of the 7th declaring that the Front has "begun a new stage, more committed than ever to permanent political action aimed at reaching the objectives of the program of profound transformation which is our *raison d'être*. We are committed to beginning a new political life in our country."

In parallel with the continuation of Broad Front activities, Havana predicted a resumption of antigovernment activities by the Tupamaros. Noting that the Tupamaros were now "without limitations of any kind" since their self-imposed truce ended with the 28 November elections, PRENSA LATINA on 6 December said that "the Tupamaros will doubtless make a rapid reappearance

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with actions that will speed up the mass politicization process and hasten the undermining of the system." After reporting on 22 December that the Tupamaros had resumed their activities by virtually destroying "the biggest golf club" in Montevideo, PRENSA LATINA on 27 December said there is "no doubt that the Tupamaros have their sights trained on members of parapolice groups," but added that "there is obviously no way of knowing where or when they will strike next."*

With the continuation of Broad Front activities and the resumption of the Tupamaros' efforts, PRENSA LATINA on 6 December said that the role of the Uruguayan people was "clear: Continue to resist to reconquer their rights." And Havana radio on the 21st contended that the peoples' resistance to "reactionary violence" in Uruguay "is growing into a struggle for complete liberation that the exploiters of our America will not be able to contain."

CASTRO Asked at his 4 December Guayaquil press conference for his postelection opinion of the Tupamaros, Castro replied, "I admire them and I support them, although this is not our business"--according to AFP. According to Guayaquil's EL UNIVERSO, he said, "I sympathize greatly with the Tupamaros," adding that aid to them was "a private matter for Cubans to consider." PRENSA LATINA's Lima correspondent reported to Havana on the 4th that during his stopover at the Lima airport Castro said that he had "great respect for the Broad Front and the Uruguayan Tupamaros."

Available Cuban media did not carry any of these reported remarks on Uruguay and have not acknowledged the Chile-Uruguayan incident provoked by Castro's alleged remark in Chile, publicized by

* PRENSA LATINA has not yet transmitted the text of a recent Tupamaro communique, filed to Havana on 10 January by its Santiago correspondent, in which the Tupamaros announced the end of their unilaterally-established election truce and their determination "to spare no effort to bring peace to the country." Stating that "we are again taking this path because the government has not come up with or does not wish to come up with another solution," the communique warned that "during this war you, the rich, will tremble in your boots and will sleep uneasily" because "we are going to enter your mansions, break into your pantries and safes We are many and we want a fatherland."

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several Latin American media, that "violence is the only road left in Uruguay for gaining power." Buenos Aires' LATIN on 2 December quoted Castro as adding that the Tupamaros "will know how to adjust to the new circumstances." Castro reportedly made these remarks in a private meeting with a group of priests on 29 November at the Cuban Embassy in Chile. Available Havana media did not publicize the meeting, although a report filed on 29 November by PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent to his Havana office quoted Castro as telling the priests that the Uruguayan elections "imposed 'the most reactionary and the most proimperialist' elements" and suggesting "the possibility of fraudulent manipulations in the elections." Castro added, the correspondent reported, that during the elections "even fear has been used, the citizens having been threatened with the mobilization of Brazilian troops on the border." The correspondent did not cite his alleged comment on violence as the only path left in Uruguay nor his reference to the Tupamaros.

Background: Although Cuban spokesmen had in the past cited Uruguay along with Chile as a possible exception to the dictum that armed struggle is the sole ultimately effective road to power, Castro in a 1 August 1970 interview withdrew the distinction, discounting the efficacy of an electoral path to revolutionary power in Uruguay while applauding the effectiveness of the Tupamaros. Further elaborating the Cuban position in an 11 November 1970 press conference, Cuban CP Secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez asserted that with the development of conditions "contrary to Uruguay's democratic traditions" that country could no longer be viewed as an "exception" to the continental pattern. Throughout this period Cuban media enthusiastically publicized the exploits of the Tupamaros, with Castro as late as 14 January 1971 describing them as "revolutionaries with a great political brain who undoubtedly have plenty of support among the masses" and who "act with responsibility."

Following the creation in February 1971 of the Broad Front, however, Cuban media began to report without comment developments in the evolution of the Front. Cuban skepticism about the coalition was reflected in its publicizing of the Tupamaros' own lukewarm support for the tactics but not the strategy of the Broad Front. Castro in his 19 April speech mentioned neither the Tupamaros nor the Broad Front.

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By his 26 July speech, however, Castro extended support to both the Tupamaros and the Broad Front, noting that "the armed struggle of the Uruguayans is growing stronger just as the Broad Front of the Uruguayans is growing stronger" and picturing the two as operating in tandem. He declared that "there is no reason to reject the possibility that by the end of the year in Uruguay, too, there may be a popular government" in power. He took essentially the same line in his 27 August speech, observing that the Uruguayan popular forces were using an "intelligent combination" of forms of struggle "on two levels, on the level of armed struggle and on the level of mass movements and legal struggle." More optimistic about the Broad Front's chances of victory than in July, Castro in August credited the Front with "great possibilities" of defeating the Uruguayan "oligarchy" in the 28 November elections.

Castro, in Chile during the final stage of the Uruguayan electoral campaign and at the time of the 28 November elections and therefore reluctant to discuss either international issues or domestic affairs of other Latin American countries, offered only minimal comment on the Uruguayan situation.* For instance, in an 11 November interview carried by Buenos Aires LATIN Castro responded to a question on armed revolution by declaring that "we do not exclude the electoral course." He subsequently declined to answer a question concerning urban guerrillas, explaining that "I cannot speak about that here, I am a guest. I will talk to you about that in Havana." Later on the 11th, however, Bogota's Cadena Nacional radio quoted him as praising the Broad Front candidate and declaring that if he were a voter in Uruguay he would vote for the Broad Front.

Declining to be drawn out further on the Uruguayan situation in his dialog with students at Concepcion University on the 18th, Castro responded to a request that he analyze the liberation struggle in Latin America with the declaration that "phenomena of a positive nature have arisen" in Latin America. He pointed out that in addition to the Chilean experience "the Broad Front exists in Uruguay" where it "is fighting an electoral battle in which all the leftist organizations are participating."

* Havana's PRENSA LATINA reported on 12 November that Uruguayan Communist Party Secretary General Rodney Arismendi had come to Chile to meet with Castro and that Castro had "taken the opportunity to send greetings to the Uruguayan Communist Party, the Broad Front, and the Uruguayan people." Buenos Aires' LATIN on 3 December carried a report that Castro had extended his visit to Chile "just in case the Broad Front won the elections."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KIRILENKO'S VISIT DRAWS UNUSUAL PUBLICITY IN MOLDAVIA

The visit of Politburo member Kirilenko to Kishinev, from 15 to 17 December, attracted unusual publicity in the Moldavian press. Kirilenko and other top leaders have been traveling about the country to deliver regional reports on the November Central Committee plenum, and Soviet press treatment of the visits and speeches has been low-keyed. The Moldavian press is the only one to deviate from a pattern of routine and very limited publicity for the leaders' visits by the local papers. Although Kirilenko has no past connection with Moldavia, his press treatment outshone the Ukraine's for its former first secretary Podgornyy, Latvia's for its former first secretary Pelshe, and even Leningrad's for General Secretary Brezhnev during his 5-day visit to that city.

Kirilenko dominated the Moldavian press for the duration of his visit. On 17 December SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA carried a photo showing him at a factory and devoted most of its front page to details of his visit. Referring to him familiarly as Andrey Pavlovich, the paper directly quoted his conversations with workers and officials. After a local production association chief praised the advantages of his association, Kirilenko was quoted as endorsing the creating of associations. (According to speakers at the Leningrad aktiv meeting, Brezhnev in his Leningrad speech also urged a speedup in forming associations--PRAVDA, 29 December).

On 18 December SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA published a photo of Kirilenko addressing the Moldavian aktiv; Brezhnev's and Pelshe's aktiv addresses were also accompanied by photos--but not the addresses of any other leaders. While Brezhnev was greeted with "warmth and cordiality" in Leningrad, the Leningrad press coverage was brief and routine, with no excerpts from his aktiv speech or his informal remarks to workers nor any other display of unusual attention, despite his status.

From middle to late December nearly every Politburo member and secretary traveled to one or two provincial cities to report at aktiv meetings on the November plenum results. Although neither the central nor local press carried any

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Excerpts from any speeches, local press comments indicate that the speeches discussed the five-year plan and the recent Soviet diplomatic offensive.* The central press treatment was even-handed, describing all Politburo members and secretaries as being "warmly greeted" by their audiences, and little effort was made to set Brezhnev much above his colleagues. Brezhnev's appearances in Moscow and Leningrad naturally received fuller coverage, and the frequent applause during his speeches was noted, but no excerpts from his speeches were published either.

Central and local press reports of the resolutions and speeches by local figures at these aktiv meetings gave credit to the Central Committee and Politburo and usually mentioned the trips of Podgorny and Kosygin along with Brezhnev's. Judging from these press accounts, Brezhnev received special attention from only four minor speakers: A worker at the Moldavian aktiv meeting and a raykom secretary at a Volyn oblast aktiv meeting spoke of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 18 December, and RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 December), an Azerbaijani kolkhoznik praised the role of the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally" in conducting foreign policy (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 21 December), and a local Moldavian Komsomol secretary praised the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally" for their concern for Kishinev (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 17 December).

REASON FOR REMOVAL OF PSKOV OBLAST LEADER REVEALED

The 4 January issue of PRAVDA reveals the apparent reason behind the removal last November of the first secretary of Pskov oblast, I. S. Gustov. Gustov is implicitly accused of failing to take a "party approach" in dealing with a corrupt subordinate. Ironically, Gustov was transferred to the position of deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee, the body that is assigned the task of safeguarding morality and discipline within the party.

* Most of the speeches were delivered in provincial areas of the RSFSR from which local papers are unavailable. Local press accounts are available for the reports of Brezhnev (Moscow and Leningrad), Podgorny (Ukraine), Kirilenko (Moldavia), Polyanskiy (Kirgizia) Pelshe (Latvia), Shelest and Shcherbitskiy (Ukraine), Kunayev (Kazakhstan), Grishin (Moscow), Masherov (Belorussia), Mzhavanadze (Georgia), and Rashidov (Uzbekistan).

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PRAVDA on 6 September 1971 exposed the financial abuses of the chief of the Pskov housing construction combine, G. D. Mentyukov. Although the main target of the September article was Mentyukov's protectors in the Leningrad-based Main Administration for Construction in the Western Regions, the Pskov gorkom was criticized for having long ignored complaints about Mentyukov before removing him.

The long 4 January PRAVDA followup is harsher on the Pskov leaders, complaining that only the intervention of central organs had "forced" the Pskov gorkom to demote the official and that the Pskov obkom bureau had limited itself to rebuking the gorkom first secretary, P. P. Kudryavtsev, for poor cadre work and to sending a terse answer to PRAVDA which "clearly could not satisfy the editors." Soon afterward, says the PRAVDA article, the obkom realized this and called PRAVDA to ask that its answer be disregarded while a new reply was being prepared. But, notes the PRAVDA correspondent, the obkom wound up dropping the matter and sending no further reply.

In the meantime, on 16 November--two months after the first PRAVDA article--the 60-year old Gustov was removed as first secretary and appointed deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee. His replacement as first secretary is not one of his deputies or the Pskov city leader, but the leader of another town in the oblast. In chiding the Pskov obkom for its unwillingness to punish properly the violator of party and state discipline, the PRAVDA articles do not mention Gustov by name, but the abuses and lack of firm action occurred under Gustov's leadership.

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